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We propose a practical quantum cryptographic scheme which combines high information capacity, such as
provided by high-dimensional quantum entanglement, with the simplicity of a two-dimensional Clauser-Horne-
Shimony-Holt (CHSH) Bell test for security verification. By applying a state combining entanglement in a
two-dimensional degree of freedom, such as photon polarization, with high-dimensional correlations in another
degree of freedom, such as photon orbital angular momentum (OAM) or path, the scheme provides a consid-
erably simplified route towards security verification in quantum key distribution (QKD) aimed at exploiting
high-dimensional quantum systems for increased secure key rates. It also benefits from security against collec-
tive attacks and is feasible using currently available technologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography is one of the most promising applications of
quantum science [1]. With the recent demonstrations of high-
dimensional two-photon entanglement using time bins [2, 3]
and OAM [4, 5], large-alphabet entanglement-based quantum
key distribution (QKD) systems become closer to their real-
world implementations and applications. The traditional ap-
proach to large-alphabet QKD based on Bell’s theorem in-
volves encoding a key in a high dimensional degree of free-
dom, such as photon OAM, and verifying the security of the
generated key using a test of a Bell inequality which requires
projective measurements in high-dimensional mutually unbi-
ased bases [6]. This is a straighforward generalization of the
original protocol introduced by Ekert in 1991 (E91) [1, 7] and
its modifications, such as proposed in Ref. [8].
E91-based protocols have been demonstrated for qubits us-
ing polarisation [9] and using time-energy entanglement [10].
A Bell-type test of energy-time entangled qutrits has also been
realised [11]. Reported Bell-test-based QKD experiments us-
ing OAM qutrits [12] have implemented a randomized selec-
tion of dichotomous measurements instead of full projective
measurements in a 3-dimensional state space. Although pro-
jective measurement for detection of high-dimensional OAM
states of light with up to 11 different outcomes is now within
reach [13, 14], it still remains an experimental challenge to
perform them in arbitrary qudit bases. In the case of high-
dimensional time-bin states, such unitary operations would
require multi-path interferometric setups which become too
cumbersome to implement for a high number of dimensions.
Although a scheme for large-alphabet QKD has been pro-
posed and realized using energy-time entanglement [15], the
applicability of this scheme is specific to this kind of entangle-
ment and the security verification is highly device dependent
as it places stringent conditions on timing resolutions of the
detectors, which limits key generation rates.
Security verification of quantum key distribution schemes
is a complicated problem in general. Security proofs have
been provided for Bell-test-based QKD against the so-called
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collective attacks [16] as well as the most general coherent at-
tacks in the standard security scenarios [17]. However, proofs
of device-independent security against these sophisticated at-
tacks are not yet available in the case of entangled qudits re-
quiring Bell tests generalised to high-dimensions [18].
Here, we propose an approach to large-alphabet
entanglement-based QKD which circumvents these problems
by avoiding the need to perform high-dimensional unitary
rotations required for measurements in different mutually
unbiased bases, resulting in a much simplified measurement
setup. The scheme presented here also benefits from security
proofs for QKD based on entangled qubits against collective
attacks. Our approach is in principle applicable to any system
in which it is possible to create bipartite two-dimensional
entanglement in one degree of freedom and high-dimensional
correlations in another. Although we will use an example
with photon polarization and OAM to illustrate the protocol,
the principle can be applied to other systems using other
degrees of freedom to encode large secret keys.
The very essence of large-alphabet QKD is the possibil-
ity of a large rate of key generation. In practice, for a given
entanglement-based QKD system, the minimum applicable
coincidence detection time window ∆t is an important factor
limiting the maximum rate at which it is possible to generate
secure keys per run, i.e., a single transmission and detection
of the source state. The higher the number of dimensions of-
fered by the source state, the higher the maximum possible
key rate per run for a given ∆t. The development of OAM
sorters makes genuine large-alphabet key generation using up
to 11-dimensional OAM entanglement feasible. This will also
allow for a higher data rate per photon pair, as the detec-
tion of the photonic qudits would not need to be implemented
as (probabilistic) dichotomous measurements as has been the
case in previous experiments [4, 12]. It is also straightfor-
ward to implement projective measurements in computational
(unrotated) time-bin bases. In what follows, we will first de-
scribe the existing generalizations of the E91 protocol. We
will then describe the source state, measurement setup, and
security considerations for our proposed scheme. Finally, we
will conclude with a few remarks on the realizability of the
proposed experimental implementations.
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2II. GENERALIZED E91 PROTOCOL
To establish our scheme, let us first review the basic
entanglement-based large-alphabet QKD resulting from a di-
rect generalization of the E91 protocol and its variants. As-
sume a source producing photon pairs in the state
|Φ〉= 1√
d
d−1
∑
j=0
| j〉A⊗| j〉B. (1)
Here we use the notation |x,y〉 ≡ |x〉⊗ |y〉, where ⊗ denotes
tensor product. In terms of OAM eigenstates |`〉 for example,
this may be written as the maximally entangled state
|Φ〉= 1√
d
`=+[d/2]
∑
`=−[d/2]
h(`)|`〉A⊗|−`〉B, (2)
where h(`) = 1 for all ` when d is odd, and h(` 6= 0) = 1,
h(0) = 0 when d is even.
In a Bell inequality test experiment, each of the commu-
nicating parties ‘Alice’ (A) and ‘Bob’ (B) will have a pho-
ton OAM detector with D outcomes per setting and two set-
tings/measurements: {A1, A2} and {B1, B2} respectively,
which maximize Bell inequality violation. For the QKD
scheme, there is an additional setting for each detector, i.e.,
A3 for Alice and B3 for Bob, chosen to produce perfect corre-
lations. In a variant of Ekert’s scheme modified for increased
key generation efficiency [8, 17, 18], only Alice’s detector
uses an additional setting, i.e., A0, which is chosen to pro-
duce perfect correlations when Bob measures with setting B1
for the purpose of key generation. Although our scheme is di-
rectly applicable to this higher-efficiency version, we mainly
illustrate here using Ekert’s scheme for clarity. Alice and Bob
independently choose their settings at random and also note
their detection results independently. After sufficiently many
measurement runs, Alice and Bob perform basis reconcilia-
tion through one-way classical post processing [20], followed
by privacy amplification on the raw key.
When the combination {A3,B3} (or {A0,B1}) is selected
by Alice and Bob, the measurement results are used for the
secret key as they are perfectly correlated on both sides. To
determine the security of this key, the correlation in the rest
of the data will be checked for eavesdropping through a Bell
inequality test, for example using Bell inequalities gener-
alised to d-outcomes per measurement proposed by Collins
et al. [21], equivalent to the CHSH-Bell inequality [22] when
d = 2. Only cases in which the combination of measurement
settings involve A1,2 and B1,2 are used for this test, while the
remaining results are discarded. After basis reconciliation,
Bob announces his data for the Bell inequality check, and
Alice computes the value of the Bell parameter S. If S > 2,
then the key is secure and the eavesdropper, Eve, will not have
gained any useful information on the key. The secret key can
then be used in any cryptographic communication between
Alice and Bob.
Implementing the above requires full projective measure-
ments in the OAM state basis {|`〉} in a d-dimensional sub-
space, corresponding to A3,B3. This may be realized, e.g. for
up to d = 11 using OAM mode sorters as mentioned above.
However, full projective measurements whose operators have
eigenstates which are OAM superpositions are also required.
It is nontrivial to realize such measurements because it re-
quires a unitary operation within the high-dimensional OAM
subspace being considered before the OAM detection. The
implementations of such operations are difficult to derive in
general, and have not yet been realized experimentally.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
A. State preparation
We propose a state which replaces the need for measure-
ments in high-dimensional rotated bases with the simplicity
of a two-dimensional CHSH Bell test for the verification of
the security of generated key. To appreciate how our source
state relates to hybrid entangled states, consider the state ex-
pressed in terms of the composite OAM and polarisation basis
states |`,P〉 (where ` denotes the OAM, `=−∞, . . . ,+∞; and
P denotes the prolarization P= H,V ) as
|Φε 〉= 1√
2d
n=+[d/2]
∑
n=−[d/2]
|2n,H〉A|−2n,H〉B
+|2n−1,V 〉A|−2n+1,V 〉B, (3)
with n 6= 0 for even d. Note that this state combines 2d-
dimensional orbital angular momentum entanglement and po-
larization entanglement in a way similar but quite different
from the cases of the so-called hyper-entangled [23], hypoen-
tangled [24] or entangled entangled [25] states. In hyper-
entanglement, a measurement of OAM will not destroy po-
larization entanglement and vice versa. In hypoentanglement,
measuring either polarization or OAM destroys entanglement
in the other degree of freedom. Here measuring OAM com-
pletely destroys polarization entanglement, but the converse
is not true. We note that the division of the subspaces (e.g.
into odd and even OAM parities in this example) can also be
done in other ways, depending on the specific realization and
experimental convenience. State (3) can be rewritten, as
|Φε 〉= 1√
d
n=[d/2]
∑
n=−[d/2]
|φ〉n, n 6= 0 for even d. (4)
Here |φ〉n is an entangled state within the nth OAM subspace.
Although this state is (hypo)entangled in both polarization
and OAM, only the classical correlation in OAM is strictly
necessary for our scheme.
Source state: Our source state is of the form
|Φdsε〉P/D =
n=[d/2]⊗
n=−[d/2]
|φ〉P/Dn , (5)
Where |φ〉P/Dn is an entangled state in polarisation within an
OAM subspace specified by n. The source state could be ob-
tained either by post-selection or deterministically (denoted
by superscripts P and D respectively) as outlined below.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Schematic diagram for a suggested implementation of the proposed simplified large-alphabet entanglement-based quan-
tum key distribution using OAM and polarization. (a) Preparation of the two-photon state |Φε 〉 [Eq. (3)] or |Φdε 〉 [Eq. (8)] using spontaneous
parametric down conversion (SPDC) in a β -barium borate (BBO) nonlinear crystal cut for type-I spontaneous parametric down conversion.
The preparation uses an OAM parity sorter [19], a polarizing beam splitter (PBS) and a non-polarising 1:1 beam splitter (BS). (b) Measurement
setup for Alice (Bob). Measurements 1, 2, and 3 i.e., A j and Bk ( j,k = 1,2,3) are respectively selected randomly (e.g., using beam splitters)
on Alice’s and Bob’s side. For the Bell test, Alice (Bob) adds (subtracts) h¯ of OAM for vertically polarised photons using PBS1, SLM1
(OAM±1) and PBS2. Then Alice (Bob) sets the half-wave plate (HWP2) orientation angle to implement the randomly chosen measurement
(A1/B1 or A2/B2). HWP2 and PBS3 are used for polarization analysis in the Bell-test, after which Alice (Bob) may then choose to reverse
the first operation by using SLM2 (OAM∓1) and PBS4. OAM sorting [13] is used to resolve the qubit subspaces and/or establish the key
(measurement 3).
1. State preparation: Post-selective case
Suppose we define
|φ〉Pn = (|HA,HB〉n+ |VA,VB〉n)/
√
2, where (6)
|HA,HB〉n = |2n,H〉A⊗|−2n,H〉B
|HA,VB〉n = |2n,H〉A⊗|−2n+1,V 〉B
|VA,HB〉n = |2n−1,V 〉A⊗|−2n,H〉B
|VA,VB〉n = |2n−1,V 〉A⊗|−2n+1,V 〉B. (7)
Note that this state is a combination of d photon pairs,
with each pair hypoentangled in both polarisation and OAM
in unique OAM subspaces.
A source state for our scheme [of the form Eq. (5)] could
be obtained by post-selection from
|Φdε 〉= |Φε〉⊗d , (8)
which is a product state of d pairs of OAM-entangled photons
where |Φε〉 is the two-photon state expressed in Eq. (3). A
proposed scheme to obtain |Φε〉⊗d from common spontaneous
parametric down conversion (SPDC) sources is illustrated in
Fig. 1(a). This involves generating OAM entanglement by
type-I collinear parametric downconversion with a defined po-
larization, say horizontal (|H〉). The co-propagating photon
pairs entangled in OAM are passed through an OAM parity
(even/odd) sorter [19]. A half-wave plate is then inserted after
one of the output arms which rotates |H〉 to vertical polar-
ization |V 〉, coupling OAM parity to polarization. The state
represented in Eq. (8) could then be generated by choosing
parameters of the SPDC source to create more than one en-
tangled photon pair simultaneously. It is well known that a
desired probability of multiple pair generation per pump pulse
can be achieved according to the theoretical d-pair creation
probability [26]
pd = (d+1)sech4(τ) tan2d(τ), (9)
where τ is a real-valued coupling coefficient which is propor-
tional to the product of the pump amplitude and the coupling
constant between the electromagnetic field and the nonlinear
crystal. The source state for our scheme can then be obtained
by final postselection on state represented by Eq. (3). This
can be done by registering only the values of n for which
both Alice and Bob have a single detection each per OAM
subspace in one run. To achieve this, it suffices to use de-
tectors which distinguish between zero, one, and more than
one photon. Such detectors have been experimentally demon-
strated [27, 28]. Also, actual photon-number-resolving de-
tectors have been realised (e.g., see [29, 30]) with increased
detection efficiencies [31].
2. State preparation: Deterministic case
A more suitable approach, however, is to prepare the source
state in a deterministic way by, e.g., using an array of d
polarization-entangled-photon sources (EPS) generating ex-
actly one photon pair at a time. Existing semiconductor quan-
tum dot (QD) systems provide a suitable platform for single
photon generation [32, 33], as well as generation of entan-
gled photon pairs on demand with high efficiency [34]. Rapid
experimental progress is also being made towards implement-
ing arrays consisting of several QD high-fidelity-entangled-
photon-pair emitters on the same chip [35]. Here, we propose
a setup utilising d EPS (see Fig. 2). OAM of ` = n, for ex-
ample, is then individually imprinted on photons emitted by
the nth source to yield state |φ〉n, resulting in basis states that
are assigned as shown below. The photons in an entangled pair
are usually generated using the biexciton-exciton-vacuum cas-
cade, and are separable based on their wavelength. Individual
photons from different pairs may then be combined into one
beam using an OAM combiner (i.e., a coherent OAM sorter
4operated in reverse) to obtain the source state |Φdsε〉 [Eq. (5)].
For this case, the entangled state |φ〉Dn within the nth subspace
defined as
|φ〉Dn =
(|HA,HB〉′n+ |VA,VB〉′n)/√2, where (10)
|HA,HB〉′n = |n,H〉A⊗|n,H〉B
|HA,VB〉′n = |n,H〉A⊗|n,V 〉B
|VA,HB〉′n = |n,V 〉A⊗|n,H〉B
|VA,VB〉′n = |n,V 〉A⊗|n,V 〉B. (11)
We note that the source state[Eq. 5] is essentially the same
for both the probabilistic and deterministic preparations ex-
cept for a change in the basis state assignment of the OAM
measurement. This basis selection is simply for the con-
venience of experimental implementation specific to each
method of state preparation.
B. Measurement settings
As in the standard case for the generalised E91 protocol
described in Section II, our scheme using the state (5) also
involves three measurement settings randomly and indepen-
dently chosen by Alice and Bob. However, the settings A1,2
and B1,2 are now achieved using polarization measurements
for maximal CHSH-Bell inequality violation. These mea-
surement settings each have two outcomes “+” and “-”. For
key generation, A3 and B3, (or A0 and B1) are the same as
described above. An important aspect of our scheme is to
perform both key generation and Bell tests individually in
each nth subspace (or channel), and simultaneously for all
n= 1, ...,d, using the same Bell-test setup.
1. Measurement: Post-selective case
To achieve the simultaneous measurements for the case
of the non-deterministic state preparation outlined in Sec-
tion III A 1 above, Alice and Bob need to first perform local
operations which make the respective OAM states degener-
ate for orthogonal polarisations of Alice’s and Bob’s photons
within each nth subspace, i.e., to disentangle the polarisation
and OAM degrees of freedom. This can be achieved if, e.g.,
Alice (Bob) subtracts (adds)h¯ of OAM for the vertically po-
larised photons [using the combination of PBS1, SLM1 and
PBS2 in Fig. 1 (b)]. This operation by Alice and Bob can be
described by the transformations QˆA and QˆB where
QˆA =
d
∑
n=1
|2n,H〉A〈2n,H|A+ |2n,V 〉A〈2n−1,V |A (12)
QˆB =
d
∑
n=1
|−2n,H〉B〈−2n,H|B+ |−2n,V 〉B〈−2n−1,V |B.
Note that this only causes a transformation of the basis states
defined in Eq. (7) as follows,
|HA,HB〉n
QˆA⊗QˆB−−−−→ |HA,HB〉Qn = |2n,H〉A⊗|−2n,H〉B,
|HA,VB〉n
QˆA⊗QˆB−−−−→ |HA,VB〉Qn = |2n,H〉A⊗|−2n,V 〉B,
|VA,HB〉n
QˆA⊗QˆB−−−−→ |VA,HB〉Qn = |2n,V 〉A⊗|−2n,H〉B,
|VA,VB〉n
QˆA⊗QˆB−−−−→ |VA,VB〉Qn = |2n,V 〉A⊗|−2n,V 〉B. (13)
A combination of a HWP and a PBS can now carry out the
Bell-test polarisation measurements (A1,2 or B1,2) for each
value of n.
We can write the CHSH inequality in the nth subspace as
Sn = En(A1,B1)−En(A1,B2)+En(A2,B1)+En(A2,B2)≤ 2,
(14)
where the correlation coefficients of the measurement Ai per-
formed by Alice and B j by Bob are defined as
En(Ai,B j) = Pn(Ai = B j)−Pn(Ai 6= B j). (15)
Pn(Ai = B j) and Pn(Ai 6= B j) are probabilities for equal and
unequal outcomes respectively, determined experimentally
using the coincidence rates within each nth subspace. The de-
tector settings for the CHSH Bell inequality violation could be
specified as measurements in the bases {|m+(θ)〉, |m−(θ)〉},
where
|m+(θ)〉=− cos(2θ)|±2n,H〉+ sin(2θ)|±2n,V 〉,
|m−(θ)〉=sin(2θ)|±2n,H〉+ cos(2θ)|±2n,V 〉. (16)
In the ± sign above, ‘+’ applies to Alice and ‘−’ applies to
Bob. A half-wave plate oriented at an angle θ rotates the
measurement basis of a polarizing beam splitter (PBS) i.e.,
{|H〉, |V 〉} to {|m+(θ)〉, |m−(θ)〉}. If we set
θ a1 = 0, θ
a
2 = pi/8, θ
b
1 = pi/16, and θ
b
2 = 3pi/16 (17)
as values of θ for A1,A2,B1 and B2 respectively so that Alice
and Bob always measure in bases which are mutually unbi-
ased with respect to each other, then we will ensure the com-
mutativity of Alice’s and Bob’s measurement outcomes and
get the maximal violation of 2
√
2 for each nth subspace of
state (5). Using the basis notation defined above [Eq. (13)],
the corresponding Bell operator [36–38] can be written as
Sˆn =
√
2( |HA,HB〉Qn 〈HA,HB|Qn + |VA,VB〉Qn 〈VA,VB|Qn
+ |HA,HB〉Qn 〈VA,VB|Qn + |VA,VB〉Qn 〈HA,HB|Qn
−|HA,VB〉Qn 〈HA,VB|Qn −|VA,HB〉Qn 〈VA,HB|Qn
+ |HA,VB〉Qn 〈VA,HB|Qn + |VA,HB〉Qn 〈HA,VB|Qn ). (18)
Obtaining the statistical data for the Bell test requires either
carrying out a detection which resolves both polarisation and
OAM or, as illustrated in Figure 1 (b), reversing operation
QˆA/B to re-establish OAM-polarisation entanglement (using
5(a) State preparation (deterministic case) (b)  Measurement (deterministic case)
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Schematic diagram for a deterministic implementation of the proposed QKD scheme (a) Suggested preparation of the
source state using an array of single-entangled-photon-pair sources (EPS), spatial light modulators (SLMs), splitters, and OAM combiners.
(b) Suggested measurement setup for Alice (Bob). Measurements 1, 2, and 3, i.e., A j and Bk ( j,k = 1,2,3) are respectively selected randomly
(e.g., using beam splitters) on Alice’s and Bob’s side. For the Bell test, Alice (Bob) sets the half-wave plate (HWP3) orientation angle to
implement the randomly chosen measurement. HWP3 and PBS6 are used for polarization analysis in the Bell-test. As in Fig. 1, OAM sorting
is used to resolve the qubit subspaces and/or establish the key.
SLM2 and PBS4), and then carrying out OAM detection. We
define the operations to reverse QˆA/B as
Qˆ−A =
d
∑
n=1
|2n,H〉A〈2n,H|A+ |2n,V 〉A〈2n+1,V |A (19)
Qˆ−B =
d
∑
n=1
|−2n,H〉B〈−2n,H|B+ |−2n,V 〉B〈−2n+1,V |B.
Since the state within the nth subspace [Eq. (6)] is maximally
entangled, it gives a maximal violation of the CHSH inequal-
ity based on operator (18)
Sn(|φ〉n 〈φ |n) = Tr(Sˆn |φ〉n 〈φ |n) = 2
√
2≥ 2. (20)
2. Measurement: Deterministic case
When the state is prepared deterministically as described
in Section III A 2, operators Qˆ(−)A and Qˆ
(−)
B [Eqs. (12) and
(19)] are not necessary for the measurements. As in the non-
deterministic case, the Bell test is carried out using a combi-
nation of a HWP and PBS [see Fig. 2 (b)], but photon num-
ber resolution and final postselection are not required. Due
to the difference in basis assignment in this case, we redefine
the detector settings for the CHSH Bell inequality violation as
measurements in the bases {|m+(θ)〉′, |m−(θ)〉′}, where
|m+(θ)〉′ =− cos(2θ)|n,H〉+ sin(2θ)|n,V 〉,
|m−(θ)〉′ =sin(2θ)|n,H〉+ cos(2θ)|n,V 〉. (21)
The optimum settings (specified by θ ) for the HWP are the
same as in Eq. (17) above, and the resulting Bell operator for
this case [see Eq. (11)] is
Sˆn =
√
2( |HA,HB〉′n 〈HA,HB|′n+ |VA,VB〉′n 〈VA,VB|′n
+ |HA,HB〉′n 〈VA,VB|′n+ |VA,VB〉′n 〈HA,HB|′n
−|HA,VB〉′n 〈HA,VB|′n−|VA,HB〉′n 〈VA,HB|′n
+ |HA,VB〉′n 〈VA,HB|′n+ |VA,HB〉′n 〈HA,VB|′n ). (22)
The state represented by Eq. (10) is also maximally entan-
gled within the nth subspace for this case, and it gives a max-
imal violation of the CHSH inequality based on operator (22)
when the key has not been eavesdropped.
C. Security against collective attacks
Any eavesdropping of the key is essentially a measurement
strategy that will destroy polarisation entanglement which is
used to establish the key. This in turn degrades the CHSH Bell
inequality violation [1] in any respective OAM subspaces. A
collective attack is one in which the eavesdropper (Eve) ap-
plies the same operation on each of Alice’s and Bob’s parti-
cles, but has no other limitations. In particular, she is allowed
to have access to a string of qubits from Alice/Bob at one time,
and to other dimensions of their particle states, even possibly
unknown to Alice/Bob. Since Eq. (5) is a product state of d
entangled qubits pairs, our scheme is essentially a multiplex-
ing of multiple polarisation-entangled qubit pairs by means
of a higher-dimensional degree of freedom, followed by inde-
pendently testing the CHSH Bell inequality simultaneously—
Eve’s access to one or more source states in our scheme is
equivalent to her access to a string of qubits on which she
can perform joint (coherent) measurements. Therefore, the
security of our scheme is completely guaranteed by the se-
curity of the individual qubit-based schemes against collec-
tive attacks [16]. This, in turn, implies security against the
most general, so-called coherent attacks [16, 39] if an ap-
plication of the exponential quantum de Finetti theorem can
60.6
0.8
0
2
4
2.2
2.4
2.8
2.6
S
Bell Parameter
Qu
ant
um
 Bi
t-e
rro
r ra
te
Se
cu
re
 b
it 
ra
te
our scheme with d = 5
qubit based
protocol
1.0
r mi
n
Q (
bit
s)
(b
its
)
FIG. 3. (Color online) Comparison of the minimum secure key rate
rmin as a function of the Bell parameter S and the quantum bit-error
rate (QBER) Q, in a single run, for our scheme with a qubit-based
E91-type protocol [17, 18]. We assume that the quantum bit error
rate Q and Bell parameter for each channel is the same, i.e., Qn =
Q, and Sn = S respectively for all n. Our scheme shows a d-fold
enhancement in secure key rate.
be made [40]. This is indeed the case in our scheme (un-
der the assumption of finite-dimensional subsystems) because
our source state is invariant under permutation of Alice and
Bob, and their measurement outcomes are commutative, as
mentioned above [Eq. (17)]. These results apply fully to our
large-alphabet protocol since it is equivalent to simultaneous
but independent 2-qubit secure protocols. The total bit rate
generated securely against collective attacks as a function of
Bell parameters Sn can therefore be written as [17]
r ≥∑
n
1−h(Qn)−h
(
1+
√
(Sn/2)2−1
2
)
(23)
where h is the binary entropy and Qn is the quantum bit er-
ror rate for channel n. As shown in Fig. 3, the larger the
measured Bell violation, the higher the secure key rate per
run. Our scheme gives a d-fold enhancement over the tradi-
tional 2-qubit schemes as a large-alphabet scheme, but uses
a much simplified Bell-test measurement setup compared to
traditional large-alphabet schemes.
The implications of loopholes for QKD based on Bell’s
theorem is worthy of some mention here. Closing the local-
ity loophole in general requires enforcing a space-like sep-
aration between Alice and Bob as required for testing non-
locality [41], but in the context of our QKD scheme, it would
be sufficient to guarantee that no quantum signals can travel
from Alice to Bob by ensuring proper isolation of Alice’s and
Bob’s locations [18]. Also, a proper closure of the detection
loophole is required for completely guaranteed security. This
seems promising as it has already been achieved in a photon-
based Bell-test experiment [42].
IV. CONCLUSION
Our scheme offers significant advantages over current gen-
eralised E91 schemes. It results in a greatly simplified secu-
rity verification and key generation setup which does not get
more complicated with increasing d, except for an increase
in the number of output ports of the OAM sorting device. It
thereby provides a route to boosting the secure key rates in
entanglement-based QKD without the usual increased com-
plexity of Bell tests in high dimensions. It also benefits from
the relative tolerance two-dimensional Bell tests to measure-
ment error. Although it is known that the amount of viola-
tion for an actual D-dimensional Bell test increases with D,
these increments are marginal even in the ideal case, and level
off as D increases [21, 43]. Also, the high sensitivity of the
complicated measurement setup to errors will usually over-
whelm these increments even for modest values of D, result-
ing in smaller violations than in the qubit case. Another ad-
vantage of our scheme where an SPDC source is used is that
non-maximal high-dimensional entanglement will not gener-
ally degrade the the verification of security. For example, the
spiral bandwidth [44] of the SPDC source will not generally
degrade Bell violation, but will only limit the effective number
of OAM channels in the non-deterministic case. Whereas, if
generalised OAM-based Bell tests are used without procrus-
trean filtering, then a small spiral bandwidth might cause a
failure of the Bell test for an entangled state [4].
In summary, this paper has described a practical scheme
in which a single CHSH-Bell test setup combined with a full
projective measurement is sufficient for security verification
even for a large-alphabet scheme capable of arbitrarily large
key rates per run. The scheme is simpler to implement than
existing generalizations of E91 protocol to high-dimensions
because it circumvents measurements in mutually unbiased
bases in high dimensions, while maintaining capacity for large
key-rate and security against collective attacks. A second sig-
nificant advantage is that non-maximal high-dimensional en-
tanglement will not necessarily degrade the verification of se-
curity. We point out that the scheme is realisable using current
technology by mentioning two examples for generating ap-
plicable source states, namely, spontaneous parametric down-
conversion and, more suitably, source of single pairs of entan-
gled photons, such as semiconductor quantum dots. From the
point of view of real-world applications of high-dimensional
QKD based on photon OAM in free space, judicious selection
of basis states [45, 46] will increase resilience against deco-
herence induced by atmospheric turbulence in a free space im-
plementation. Although this can be applied within the frame-
work of this scheme, implementations with time bins [10, 47]
or path appear especially promising for long distance appli-
cations. The complexity of security verification in large-
alphabet entanglement-based QKD makes it apparent that the
simplified scheme presented here will likely enable otherwise
infeasible secure key rates in QKD, enabling more practical
implementations of entanglement-based technologies.
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